安妮-玛丽·斯劳特，福布斯全球最迷人女性之一，美国政治、外交政策与国际事务学者，曾担任美国国际法协会主席，2002年至2009年她担任普林斯顿大学威尔逊公共与国际事务学院（Woodrow Wilson School）的院长，2009年1月至2011年2月，她担任希拉里·克林顿的政策规划办公室主任，成为美国国务院政策规划主任的第一位杰出女性，是美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿的左膀右臂。
本期看见网·羊说除对话斯劳特关于国际关系战略的新书《棋盘与网》，同时也分享斯劳特在《大西洋月刊》上发表的题为Why Women Still Can't Have It All的文章：该文章是一份世界女性领导人的宣言书，也反映了斯劳特在国务院工作的同时还要照顾两个十几岁儿子的生活状态。值得一提的是，该文章在《大西洋月刊》创刊以来点击量最高。开头TED演讲视频，并不能代替原文的阅读，却可以作为这篇文章的梗概版。新浪财经有编译，翻得不全，有一定误导性，可与英文原文对照读（文章编译链接）
seebadnewsYANG: Thank you for bringing some sociology into international relations. [LAUGHTER] So you differentiated the chessboard of traditional strategy and the web of networks, interests, and leadership. But the deeper story I got is a different picture of leadership in network[s], how it is more musical than military.
ANNE-MARIE: [LAUGHS] Yes, it's orchestrated—I used that word, yes.
seebadnewsYANG: So I wonder, how do you see the much-speculated Thucydides Trap between the US and China? Will there be a way or strategy of web out of this much-speculated, pessimistic vision between the rising-power China and the status-quo power of the United States?
向杨：我有些好奇，你怎么看待很多人都猜测会发生在中美之间的修昔底德陷阱呢？有没有一套方式或是策略可以跳出这个大家都猜测会发生的、有些悲观的前景呢，就是崛起的中国会对抗美国这个现有秩序下的大国？（注：修昔底德是古希腊历史学家、思想家。而该说法由由美国政治学家格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham T. Allison）提出，指一个新崛起的大国必然要挑战现存大国，而现存大国也必然会回应这种威胁，这样一来战争就变得不可避免。这一概念来自修昔底德的名言“使战争不可避免的真正原因是雅典势力的增长和因而产生的斯巴达的恐惧。”羊说就修昔底德陷阱问题也采访过美国前副国务卿托尼·布兰肯，详见：🖱️专访 | 美国前副国务卿托尼·布兰肯：中美博弈，下围棋还是象棋？）
ANNE-MARIE: Thank you, that's a great question. So on the chessboard, you can't avoid the Thucydides Trap. The rising power, the dominant power. You can fight it out—which we hope we're not going to do, or you can, you know, you can have it gradually work over time if you think of, you know, Britain and Germany fought it out. Britain and the US. Over time, Britain ceded power to the United States but stayed a close ally of the United States. But sooner or later—so it can be dealt with more or less conflict, but that essential dynamic is there. This is one where, if you know that dynamic is there, you should be creating every network you can to strengthen relations between the two states to do a couple of things. One, to have as many people as possible in both states who see the other state not as a threat, but as a friendly competitor. And that, of course, in many ways, is what we try to do through student exchanges, although it doesn't always work. A large part of it also depends on how those students are received. It's, I mean, you can go be educated abroad and not necessarily think that that country is a country you see in a friendly way, but overall, educated people in both countries is important. But you also need to be creating networks around environment, where we do have common interest, even if the government doesn't recognize we have a common interest. Lots of NGOs recognize we have a common interest—counter-terrorism, which we do have. That's an area where we work. Humanitarian assistance, and business. But here's a great example of where we have those networks. I mean, we have lots of Chinese and Americans who interact. But are we being strategic about what those networks look like? Are we thinking, okay, if the point is confidence-building, and dissemination of different views of the other country, what does the structure of that network look like? Could—maybe we could create a replication network that would go of its own, so it would have much greater reach. And the reason you build those networks, of course, is that in that chessboard dynamic, when moments come—and the one I worry about all the time, of course, is some kind of incident in the South China Sea. Can you imagine it now? Can you imagine Xi Jinping facing a party Congress and a president of the United States who's just only too eager to demonstrate his toughness? That looks like Sarajevo. That looks like it could be World War I. At that moment, you want as many different channels of communication and influence and genuine connection as you can have, and you need to note where they are and how to do something. So, again we have them, but that's what I mean by strategies of connection—I don't think we have it strategically.