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专访前美国副国务卿布兰肯:反恐、难民危机与欧盟
2019-03-25 05:43:15   来源:看见网 原创   作者:看见网·羊说   编辑:纪许光
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        独家对话前副国务卿布兰肯:谈反恐、难民危机与欧盟
 
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核心提示:
托尼·布兰肯(Tony Blinken)于2015-2017年担任副国务卿(Deputy Secretary of State),系美国外交事务的二号人物
(仅次于国务卿约翰·克里)。作为副国务卿,他到访过40个国家,领导对付伊斯兰国(ISIL)的外交战略,筹备亚洲再平衡战略(The Rebalance to Asia),以及全球难民危机。在国务院期间,他主导搭建和创新社群的桥梁,与硅谷合作,开启国务院创新论坛(The State Department Innovation Forum),招募创新人才和技术人才解决复杂的外交政策难题。

 

 

        托尼·布兰肯在国务院任职前,曾作为奥巴马总统的白宫助理(Assistant to the President)以及国家安全副主任顾问(Principal Deputy National Security Advisor)。他主持的机构间副手委员会(The Inter-agency Deputies Committee),系政府中最重要的外交政策制定平台。在奥巴马第一任期间,他担任总统副助理(Deputy Assistant)以及副总统拜登的国家安全顾问(National Security Advisor to the Vice President)。托尼在早期(1994-1998),曾主管克林顿总统演讲稿写作事宜。
 

本期看见网@对话高端访谈,与托尼·布兰肯面对面。讲述国际视野下的反恐议题:

 

 

 

 

对话一:谈反恐

 

Seebadnews YANG: So I just read a piece by Robert Pape and Mike Morell [TONY: Mhm.] on their study of terrorists in the United States. [TONY: Mhm.] They documented 125 [TONY: Yeah.] people who conducted terrorist attacks or failed to conduct terrorist attacks [TONY: Yeah.] and was also indicted by the Justice Department. [TONY: Yeah.] Turns out 81% of them [TONY: Mhm.] are American citizens. [TONY: Citizens, yeah.] and 78% of them are actually born in the United States, 11% hold green cards. Only 8% are non-citizen [TONY: Yeah.] and non-green card holders. [TONY: Yeah.] There's also a lag between the point when they came to the U.S. [TONY: Mhm.] and the point when they actually commit a [TONY: A crime.] a terrorist attack. [TONY: Okay.] So I wonder what—is there a necessity in terms of forging a battle against this ideological influence—is there a strategy about this—in the ideological battle, not just, you know, bombing those terrorists outside the United States or, you know, travel ban. [TONY: Yeah.] Is there a history of strategy over this issue?

看见网·向杨:我最近刚刚读了罗伯特·帕普和麦克·莫雷尔 【托尼:嗯】关于美国恐怖分子的一份研究【托尼:嗯】。(注:2017年2月27日,Robert Pape 和Mike Morell在华盛顿邮报上发表了题为“川普的旅行禁令忽视了什么:极端主义的美国公民才是更大的安全威胁)他们记载了被司法部正式起诉的125个恐怖分子,包括制造了及未遂的恐怖袭击案【托尼:是的]。事实证明这些恐怖分子中81%是美国公民 【托尼:嗯】,78%出生在美国【托尼:是的】,11%持有绿卡。只有8%既不是美国公民也不是绿卡持有者【托尼:是的】。并且,后者到达美国之后真正实施恐怖袭击【托尼:犯罪】之前还有一段时间上的空档【托尼:嗯]。所以我很好奇,在对抗意识形态影响的这场战争中,是不是有必要-有一个战略-对抗意识形态,你知道,不简单只是轰炸在美国领土外的恐怖分子,或者是旅行禁令【托尼:是的】。历史上有没有关于这个问题的相关战略呢?

 

TONY: Yeah, a huge effort has gone into this and I can't say that it's been totally satisfactory, but we've—we work pretty hard both to try to understand better the drivers—what turns someone into a quote-unquote "loser," and at various—what are the different way-stations along the way, and can you interrupt that process at the very start, not when it's already too late. So it's said sometimes there are societal factors, economic factors, political factors, community factors, family factors, you name it. So that's one piece of it, and we try to better understand that and then we'll get the strategy.

托尼:的确,我们很大一部分的精力都花在反恐战略上。我不能说我们的努力结果非常令人满意,不过我们已经--我们尽了很大的努力去更好地理解驱使(恐怖分子形成)的原因-是什么原因让一个人变成了所谓的“失败者”,(注:2017.5.22曼切斯特体育馆爆炸,22人遇难,特朗普在回应中称恐怖分子为Evil Losers)并且有哪些-有什么不同的方法,在什么阶段,可以让我们及早地阻止他们(恐怖分子)的形成。所以这背后的原因有时候是社会因素,经济因素,政治因素,社区影响,家庭因素,你能想到的都可能。这些因素是一部分,我们正在努力更好的理解它们,然后我们才可能有对应的策略。

 

Another big piece of it is engagement with the communities—the people who are living in it—because the best way to see something before it becomes a problem, the most likely to have that happen, had a family friend at the community level, not a Washington figurine out in the distance. And that puts a premium on having really good relationships with communities where there are people maybe more at risk of winding up on the wrong side of the line. And having relationships of trust, which is why one of the many reasons why demonizing Muslims or trying to keep people out of the country is not a really smart strategy, because it's the best way to undermine your relationship with the community that you need to be working with, not against.

另一个(对抗恐怖分子的)重要策略组成部分是建立与当地社区的合作和互动-和住在当地社区的居民-因为在从一件事变成一个问题之前,最可能发现的不是通过远在千里之外的华盛顿领导者,而是在当地社区内的家人朋友。并且,有一些风险较高,较容易一不小站错队的人,与他们所在的社区保持良好的关系给我们提供了一种保障。有这种以信任为基础的关系很重要,这也是为什么将穆斯林群体恶魔化或是将特定的一群人拒之门外并不是一种聪明的策略。这很严重的伤害了我们和这个群体的关系,我们应该是互相合作的,而不是站在彼此的对立面。

 

We look very hard at the impact of the internet, because one of the challenges that emerged is that whereas before the internet, if someone was going to become radicalized, you almost certainly had to have human, face-to-face contact. Now this can happen in the privacy of someone's, you know, bedroom or living room, without actually having direct contact. How do we think about what the proper role is for government and non-governmental groups, making sure that the conversation that's taking place is balanced and not one-sided? In the early days of the Islamic State, when they were very adept at using modern tools of communication, and they were disproportionately present in ways that we weren't. And our first response was, "Oh, we gotta push back, and combat them in whatever way we can, on the internet." And then we came to the realization, through a lot of trial and error, that probably, the U.S. government was not the most credible voice in pushing back. So we looked to spend our resources and focus and energy on identifying credible voices to push back that were not our own. So that's been the evolution there.

我们非常关注互联网的影响力。在互联网出现以前,任何人极端化的过程中势必要和别人有面对面的接触。而现在,这些完全可以发生在非常私人的的卧室或者客厅里,并不需要双方正面接触。(在这种情况下)我们如何定位政府或者非营利机构的角色,保证双方之间发生的交流是不偏不倚的?在伊斯兰国建立的初期,他们运用现代交流工具非常娴熟,跟我们在网络上的存在感知度是不成正比,比我们要高很多。我们那时起初的回应是,“噢,我们应该要反击,在互联网上以任何可能的方式反击。” 之后经过一系列的尝试和失败,我们也意识到美国政府官方可能并不是在反击上最有可信度的声音。于是我们转向将资源和重心转向了寻找辨认那些除了我们之外有可信度的声音。这个过程也是个进步。

 

And then, of course, you're exactly right—you know, you can't, by definition, you can't bomb this away. So a lot of this is also about creating the right kind of counter-networks of communities, but also police, intelligence, and sharing information in real time in ways that can make you much more effective at identifying people before it's too late and then trying to stop them before it's too late. But the other reality is of course, you know, if you're playing defense, you have to be right 100% of the time. And even if you're right 99% of the time, but that 1% you're not, it can do terrible damage.

当然,你说的完全正确-你知道,从本质来说,恐怖分子是没办法被炸光的。所以很大部分(解决的方案)包括建立正确有效的反恐网络-社区,警察,情报局以及实时信息分享。这能使我们能更高效快速的发现及制止恐袭。但是另一方面,现实就是,你知道,如果我们一直处于防守状态,我们就必须保证100%的正确。即使我们正确率是99%,只要有1%的情况下我们是错的,后果也是不堪设想的。

 

Last point is, there is though obviously a role for the big military piece, and in the case of the Islamic State, what's separated them from previous groups is, while the ideology has been to try to form a so-called caliphate, the Islamic State was really the first to, in a very meaningful way, get physical territory and declare the existence of a physical state, not just the idea of one. And that became very powerful, it became very powerful as a practical recruiting tool because it gave foreign fighters an actual place to go to, and that's why we've spent tens of thousands going to Syria, going to Iraq—it was actually there. It was practically powerful as well, because in controlling territory, they also controlled resources to exploit—oil, banks, people. And that actually funded their activities.

最后一点就是,尽管军队很明显具有很重要的作用,但在应对伊斯兰国上,我们要记得他们跟以往的组织是不一样。和过去的组织一样, 伊斯兰国有着类似的意识形态,既建立一个所谓的伊斯兰帝国(即哈里发),伊斯兰国却是第一个在真正意义上获得土地和宣称主权的实体组织。这点(有占领地)是招募外国战士非常强有力的工具因为这些战士现在有个明确的目的地,也是我们为什么把上万美军送往叙利亚和伊拉克-因为那里就是恐怖分子的目的地。控制领地另一方面也有实际上的利益:伊斯兰国能够控制当地的资源用以出口-石油,银行,人力。这些资源都资助了他们的活动。

 

But mostly, it was powerful because it was a narrative. And it gave people the impression that they had actually formed a state, that they had realized a physical caliphate. And that became very, very attractive as a story in pulling people in. If you can take that away, if you can destroy the physical caliphate, they declared, then foreign fighters suddenly won't have a place to go. Resources that are being exploited, they don't have. But maybe most important—the narrative is destroyed. And they'll come up with other narratives. But it's still—that had been very powerful. That's why trying to take the fight to the Islamic State, or "Daesh," as we prefer to call it—in Iraq and Syria—in my judgment, at least, was important, because it does take away the physical caliphate.

不过最主要的是,这(控制土地的能力)是有说服力的故事。他们给人留下一个似乎已经真的建立了一个国家的印象,他们似乎建立了一个实体的哈里发。如果你可以将那个(占领地)夺去,那个他们所宣称的实体领地,那么外国战士就没有地方去(参战)。现在被占用的资源,他们也不再会有。不过更重要的或许是能够摧毁他们(招募战士的)叙事。当然他们还会想出其他的宣传手段(叙事)。不过即使是这样,(摧毁他们的占领地)非常强有力。这也是为什么我们在伊拉克和叙利亚两国和伊斯兰国,我们更喜欢称为Daesh (注:音译为“达伊什”。伊斯兰国是一个政教合一的政治实体,推行极端宗教思想,其残忍与理念并不为信仰伊斯兰教的人们认同。所以,大多数阿拉伯国家人们认为这个极端组织侮辱了伊斯兰,并不用伊斯兰国称呼巴格达迪的王国,取用这一组织阿拉伯语的简写发音,即“达伊什”,在阿拉伯语中是践踏的意思,是种有意的蔑称。)坚持斗争到底,在我看来,至少目前来说,非常重要。因为这样“达伊什”就没有(用来编故事宣传招募的)实际占领地了。

 

Now, if you can't replace that with something that brings people along in supporting what comes next, you're gonna wind up right back where you started at some point, and you might have—you might eliminate Daesh now, but if the conditions that led to its emergence are still there, you'll have Daesh 2.0 at some point. So you're only as good as the politics and economics that follow whatever your military does. But I do think that's an important piece too.

当然,如果我们无法在这(摧毁占领地)之后提供当地人们所支持的环境,我们很可能又退回到了最初的起点,我们可能消灭了达伊什, 但是得以让达伊什滋生成长的环境仍然没变,我们就可能会看到达伊什2.0 。所以说,最好的结果只会体现在使用军事力量之后的政治经济战略。不管怎么样,我认为这是一个很重要的组成部分。

 

It's a long way of saying, there really needs to be a comprehensive approach, and that's what we tried to put in place. But terrorists terror for a reason—it doesn't take much to scare the heck out of people. And because you can't be 100% effective on defense, things are gonna happen. What we're seeing now is, ironically in part because of the success of the effort in Iraq and in Syria to squeeze and limit and ultimately destroy the caliphate, they're trying to push as much as they can in different places around the worlds—either through affiliates or by inspiring people, or just taking credit [YANG: Mhm.] from people who commit acts, who weren't actually instructed by the Islamic State, but then they take advantage of it. And we don't know—at least I don't know enough yet about what happened horrifically yesterday in England, but that seems to be an example of it.

这个问题能说的很多,我们需要一个全方位的方案,我们也正试图往这方面努力。不过恐怖分子袭击总是有理由的—因为要恐吓任何人并不难。另外,我们也不可能做到100%的防御,所以恐怖袭击总是会发生。讽刺的是,我们现在面对的问题一部分是因为我们在伊拉克和叙利亚所取得的成功-我们将ISIS和他们建立的“哈里发”赶出了这两个国家。于是,他们现在正设法在世界各地不同地方建立同盟或者激励人家加入他们,或者只是让人们相信很多实施恐怖袭击是他们的功劳。这其中很多并不是真正由伊斯兰国策划的,不过他们利用这些袭击(宣传)。我们目前还不知道——至少我还不了解昨天发生在英国可怕的恐怖袭击的具体细节,不过看上去很像是这么一个例子(伊斯兰国窃取他人恐怖袭击成果)。(注:与布兰肯的问答发生在2017.5.22曼切斯特体育馆爆炸的第二天。)

 

 

 

对话二:谈难民危机

 

seebadnews YANG: So I see this problem as contention between undemocratic liberalism and democratic illiberalism. [TONY: Mhm.] Citizens have the right to decide the border [TONY: Mhm.]—that's the democratic part—but it can be very illiberal. On the other hand, if we expand the refugee[s], you know, coming into the country, it's undemocratic [TONY: Mhm.], even though it's liberal. So I think the basic thing is how we understand a refugee, how they would affect the economy, how they would affect the community. So I heard lots of other stories on the plus-side of the equation, that the refugee[s], when they come into the country, they've decided to plan long-term [TONY: Mhm.] and they want their children to get a better education and a lot of them are very well-educated. [TONY: Mhm.] So my question is, what are the facts of the refugee[s]? Not necessarily from Syria [TONY: Mhm.], but political refugees and refugees from other countries? [TONY: Mhm.] How can we see the whole picture, not necessarily see the vulnerabilities of the refugees—[that] they are aliens rather than strangers or ethnics, or they are vulnerable to the policy shift. We often depict them as vulnerable people [TONY: Yeah.], so what would be the plus side of the refugees? 

看见网·向杨: 我觉得这个问题是非民主自由主义和民主反自由主义之间的抗衡。【托尼:嗯。】公民有权利决定自己国家的边界【托尼:嗯。】——这是民主机制的一部分——当然也可能导致反自由主义出现。另一方面,如果我们(单方面)增加难民进如入这个国家的数量,又是不民主的,即使这(给予更多难民机会进入美国)体现了自由主义精神。所以在我看来,最基本的问题是我们要真正了解不同的难民,了解他们对于经济的影响,以及他们将会如何影响当地社区。我听说很多关于难民带来附加值的说法——当他们进入一个国家,他们一般都有长远的计划,【托尼:嗯】他们希望孩子能够得到更好的教育,他们当中很多人受教育程度非常高 【托尼:嗯】。所以我们的问题是,关于难民情况的真相如何?不一定特指叙利亚难民【托尼:嗯】,也有其他国家来的政治和经济庇护的难民?【托尼:嗯】我们如何有个全局观,不一定是只看到这些难民脆弱的一面——我们看到他们是异乡人,而不是陌生人和不同民族的人,或者认为他们在政策改变时容易处于劣势。我们经常将他们描绘成弱势群体【托尼:是的】, 难民群体的自然优势是什么?

 

TONY: Well, let me illustrate with a story, for what it's worth. I was in Amman, Jordan for a meeting with a group of Syrian refugees. Not kids, these were teenagers—15, 16, 17 years old, at a center that was basically a community center run by UNICEF, which does remarkable work as well. And we were just sitting around the table, talking, and they had been in Jordan anywhere from a few years to just a few months. And I was just really curious and asking them about how did they think about the future. Did they even think about it, or were they just living in this day-to-day challenge of having been—totally disrupted lives, thrown up in the air. And the first thing that was really interesting was, they all had some vision of what they wanted to do in the future. And I still remember one young woman wanted to be a doctor, another wanted to be in fashion. A couple of the young men wanted, you know, to be in business. One was interested in sports, but they all had some idea. And interestingly, one of the things you see—and this is not at all uniform—but in the case of Syria, often the people who are able to get out tend actually to be middle class. They're the ones who actually have the means and the resources in many cases to actually escape. So when they tend, relatively speaking, to be more educated. So you're dealing with people who, you know, were contributors certainly, to their sides. So that was one thing that was interesting.

托尼:这样吧,我给你说个故事,可能能回答你的问题。我在约旦国首都安曼(AMMAN)的时候见了一些叙利亚难民,不是孩子,都是15,16,17岁的青少年。我们在联合国儿童基金会(The United Nations Children’s Fund)管理的一个社区中心见了面。联合国儿童基金会在那里做了很多很棒的项目。我和那些难民青少年就只是围着桌子坐着聊天,他们有些人在那里几个月,有些人有几年了。我问了他们些问题,很好奇他们对于未来是怎么想的。他们有没有考虑过,或者说他们只是考虑日复一日生活上遇见的挑战——完全被打乱悬在半空中的生活。有意思的是,这些青年人对未来多多少少有些展望。我仍然记得其中一个年轻人想要成为医生,另一个想要在时尚界发展。有好几个年轻人想要从事商业。一个对于体育很感兴趣但他们基本对于未来都有些想法。有意思的是,有一件事——并不是统一的——就叙利亚的情况来说,就是有能力(从战乱国家)逃出来的都是中产阶级。很多情况下,他们中产阶级才有资源和办法真正逃出来。所以这些难民,相对而言,受教育程度更高。(换句话说)我们现在打交道的,你知道,是对社会有贡献的一群难民,这是很有趣的一点。

 

We're talking and I was wondering the extent to which these kids had access to computers, given the importance of computers in just about everything. So I asked, and the answer I got was also interesting—was that virtually all of them did. Either there was a smart phone in their family—even though they were, you know, left everything—they had money somehow, but one thing that they thought was really important, the families saw as important was to have a smartphone. So they either had that or they had access to computers at the UNICEF community center, so we were talking about that. And then it struck me, and I said, "So, how many of you know what this is?" A couple of them said, "Yeah, that's an iPhone." And I asked them, "Do you know who makes the iPhone?" And a couple of them said, "Oh yeah, Apple." And then I asked, "Do you know who started Apple, who founded the company?" And one of them said, "Oh yeah, Jobs, right, Steve Jobs." And then I said, "Do you know where Steve Jobs' father came from?" There was silence. And of course, he's Syrian. And I say that just to illustrate the point that on one level, arguably, any of those kids, if given the opportunity, could be the next Steve Jobs. Now, not everyone anywhere is gonna be Steve Jobs. But you're dealing with a generation that has just innate talents anywhere. To sacrifice that, to lose that is actually doing a huge disservice, not only to those people, but actually, even potentially to your own country. And again, the United States is kind of in a unique situation because, arguably, we've done better and benefitted more from waves of immigrants than just about any other country on earth, and you can illustrate that in lots of different ways. And you know, you do the thought experiment of thinking of what would the country be like without recent waves of immigrants—well, you know, there goes eBay, there goes Google, there goes Apple. And that's just at the high end—that literally, day in, day out we know in our communities, that people are doing things, for better or worse, that folks who were already here wouldn't choose to do. So, I think there are ways of showing it statistically, there are ways of illustrating it emotionally.

跟他们聊着聊着,我很好奇这些孩子在多大程度上可以有机会接触到电脑,(毕竟)现在的大环境下,做每件事都涉及到电脑。所以我就问了,他们的回答很有意思——基本所有人以前都有机会接触到电脑。每个家庭都会至少有一部智能机,即便是他们被迫将所有财物留在身后——可能身上会带点钱,对于很多人来说,有一部智能手机是跟有钱一样重要的。所以我们之后就聊到说,这些年轻人要不是就是有一部手机要不就是用儿童基金会社会中心的电脑。然后我突然意识到一个问题,于是我就问道,“你们当中有多少人知道这(此时,布兰肯指着自己的iphone)是什么?”他们其中一些回答说,“苹果手机。”我接着问,“你们知道这个手机的制造商是谁嘛?”其中一些说,“苹果公司”。我又问,“那你们知道谁创办了苹果公司?” 他们当中一个人回答说,“知道,斯蒂夫·乔布斯。”我接着问,“那你们知道乔布斯的父亲是哪里人吗?”只有一阵沉默没有人回答。当然,他(乔布斯的爸爸)是叙利亚人。我就是想说,这些孩子,只要给予他们足够的机会,从某种程度上来说,他们可能成为下一个乔布斯。当然啦,并不是所有人都可以成为下一个乔布斯,但是他们这一代年轻人,不管是从哪里来的,都可能有着无限的才能。失去这些才能对于这些年轻人来说是一种伤害,对于我们这样一个国家来说,甚至也是有害无利。再加上,美国在移民问题上又有着独特的态度。从不同方面来说,相比其他任何国家,我们国家都从过往几代移民潮中受利最多。你也知道,我们经常会做一些假设性的思考,我们国家如果没有过往几代的移民加入,这个国家会是什么样——我们不会有易贝(EBAY),不会有谷歌(GOOGLE),更不会有苹果公司(APPLE)。而这仅仅是从最高层面来看,就日常生活来看,我们社区里的移民或好或坏,从事着本地人不愿意从事的工作。所以,从理性的统计数字来说,我们可以证明移民带来的好处,从感性的角度来说,也是如此。

 

 

对话三:谈欧盟共同体

 

seebadnews·YANG: So one of the arguments against the EU is there's a mismatch between fiscal redistribution and the economy's growth. [TONY: Mhm.] For example, in some Southern European countries, like what they often call "PIIGS," [TONY: Yeah.] they have lots of young people going to France or Germany for job opportunities, [TONY: Yeah.] leaving some older and less enthusiastic, less ambitious people in their own countries. So the economy would take the hit, while the other more like economic engines are unwilling to give the money to them, because it's from their taxpayers. So there's a mismatch of this. [TONY: Yeah.] But in other countries, like the United States, the federal government would redistribute money to some states like Alabama. Also in China [TONY: Yeah.], the central government would redistribute money to the west [TONY: Yeah.] to Tibet. So will this be the headache in the future and will there be a pathway forward?

向杨: 关于欧盟的争论有一点涉及到财政支付转移和经济增长的不匹配 【TONY: 嗯】。 比如说,在南欧一些国家,人们通常称为“欧猪五国”(注:即“PIIGS”,系国际债券分析家、学者和国际经济界对欧洲五个主权债券信用评级较低的经济体的贬称。分别是葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊、西班牙的首字母。)的那些国家【TONY:嗯】,这些国家的许多年轻人回去法国或者德国寻找工作机会【TONY:嗯】,留下了年纪大和那些热情不高,野心不大的人留在了自己国家,所以这些国家的经济会受到打击,然而另外一些被称作欧洲经济引擎的国家(如德国、法国)并不情愿给前者提供经济上的帮助,因为这些经济补助是从他们自己国家的纳税人手里出的。所以我们就看到了这种财政和经济的不匹配【TONY:嗯】。在另外一些国家,如美国,联邦政府会给像是阿拉巴马这样的州在财政上拨款。在中国也是【TONY:是的】,中央政府会给西部地区,如西藏地区拨款。所以您认为在未来,这将会成为欧元区令人头痛的问题,还是未来会有继续前进的解决方案?

 

TONY: Yeah, I think you also identify one of the other truly central problems and one that we've seen play out in the Eurozone crisis. You have—I'm going back, you know, seven, eight years, the economic crisis that even well before Brexit, well before Le Pen, well before Wilders—those kind of political challenges was a dagger pointed at the heart of the youth. And it's had a hugely tough time grappling with that, and it still hasn't figured it out. And it's been a division between leading countries that think that the recipe for these questions is heightened and developed prosperity, that's the German approach. And those who think that to the contrary, you need to—particularly a country like Greece, or Italy before that, Spain, Portugal—actually show some largess and spend money to bolster people, and you have this divide.

托尼:是的, 我认为你指出了欧洲众多问提中一个真正的核心,一个在欧洲金融危机中我们看到的问题。让我从7年,8年前的金融危机说起,从英国脱欧之前,从Le Pen 和Wilders出现之前(注:Marine Le Pan: 法国极右翼政党“国民阵线”前主席,2017法国总统竞选候选人,败于马克龙;Geert Wilders是荷兰自由党领导人,以批评伊斯兰教在国内外知名。)——这些政治危机是插在年轻人心中的一把匕首。这些欧洲国家经历了一个很痛苦的过程解读这个问题和找到解决方案。这个问题在特别发达的国家和剩下的一些国家中导致了分歧,主导经济发展的国家认为解决方案就是经济更高速的发展,这是德国的一套。另一些国家正相反,他们需要——特别是像希腊或者意大利,在这之前是西班牙和葡萄牙——引擎国家(指德法两国)真正体现出慷慨(指财政补助),在这些弱国的老百姓身上花钱来激励他们。于是我们就看到了欧洲不同国家政策的分歧。

 

In Europe, at the same time, exactly as you pointed out, the very freedom of movement has been at the heart of the European project, has also created these big imbalances. Arguably, overall, it's clearly been beneficial, and it's arguably been overall more efficient in directing people to where jobs might be. And so—and without regulations. You know, you can be a Romanian airline pilot flying for Air France and you don't have to get re-licensed across the border. But, in good times, that's terrific. The pie gets bigger, there's plenty to go around, and everyone benefits. But when you're going through tough times, then some of this stuff really creates a problem, and all of a sudden, the famous Polish plumber is putting French plumbers out of a job, or Romanian construction worker is doing the same thing. And that's when people start to become protectionist. But they can't, because of the EU are such that there can't really be significant national protections, and that's when you get this big pushback.

同时在欧洲,正像你指出的,欧洲共同体建设进程中,行动自由(即出入境自由)也造成了非常大的不平衡。有观点认为,总体上来说,这是好的,更高效的引导人们去有工作机会的地区发展,当然缺乏一定的制约机制。你知道嘛,一个罗马尼亚的飞行员可以飞法国航空航班,在跨国界的情况下不重新考取飞行驾照。在经济条件好的时候,这个宽松的管理机制很棒。大饼越做越大,足够大家分享,每个人都能获益。但是在经济比较艰辛的时期,这些(宽松的管理机制和劳动力流动)就开始引发问题,突然之间,著名的波兰管道工抢走了法国管道工的工作,罗马尼亚建筑工人也是如此。人在这种时候容易变成了地方保护主义者。但是他们不能,因为欧盟的体制是不允许相当程度的地方保护主义的,于是我们也就看到了的巨大的反击。

 

So part of it is, how do you—how does the Union allocate resources and particularly, what does it do when countries get into trouble? And part of it is, how does it mitigate the downsides of all of this freedom of movement, and not just take advantage of the upsides? How does it figure out a way forward? And there are real ideological differences among the leading countries about how to do that. What's interesting now is, the question is whether the French or Germans come a little bit closer together. And the Germans have of course benefitted hugely, because they've been able to have an export-driven economy by supporting to all the other countries in the Union and they want to preserve that. It's going to be interesting to see what Macron does as he is trying to reform the French economy, what is it the Germans like. But at the same time, wants to see the Germans, in effect, invest more in the rest of Europe. That's the other question.

因此,问题的一部分是--欧盟如何(合理地)分配资源,特别是对于那些陷入经济窘境的国家?问题的另一部分是,如何缓解这些行动自由的负面效应,而不是单单利用它?欧盟如何能够找到前进的道路?就解决方案而言,在经济领先的国家中也存在着意识形态上的分歧。有趣的是,德国或者法国能不能在这个问题更接近。德国在这过程成功地利用出口主导型经济模式对欧盟其他国家进行资助,从中获益颇多所以他们想要保留这种模式。在未来,法国总统马克龙会如何转型法国的经济将会非常有意思,是不是会变成类似德国的模式。同时,另一个问题是德国愿不愿意对欧洲其他国家进行更多的投资。
 

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