Seebadnews YANG: So I just read a piece by Robert Pape and Mike Morell [TONY: Mhm.] on their study of terrorists in the United States. [TONY: Mhm.] They documented 125 [TONY: Yeah.] people who conducted terrorist attacks or failed to conduct terrorist attacks [TONY: Yeah.] and was also indicted by the Justice Department. [TONY: Yeah.] Turns out 81% of them [TONY: Mhm.] are American citizens. [TONY: Citizens, yeah.] and 78% of them are actually born in the United States, 11% hold green cards. Only 8% are non-citizen [TONY: Yeah.] and non-green card holders. [TONY: Yeah.] There's also a lag between the point when they came to the U.S. [TONY: Mhm.] and the point when they actually commit a [TONY: A crime.] a terrorist attack. [TONY: Okay.] So I wonder what—is there a necessity in terms of forging a battle against this ideological influence—is there a strategy about this—in the ideological battle, not just, you know, bombing those terrorists outside the United States or, you know, travel ban. [TONY: Yeah.] Is there a history of strategy over this issue?
看见网·向杨：我最近刚刚读了罗伯特·帕普和麦克·莫雷尔 【托尼：嗯】关于美国恐怖分子的一份研究【托尼：嗯】。（注：2017年2月27日，Robert Pape 和Mike Morell在华盛顿邮报上发表了题为“川普的旅行禁令忽视了什么：极端主义的美国公民才是更大的安全威胁）他们记载了被司法部正式起诉的125个恐怖分子，包括制造了及未遂的恐怖袭击案【托尼：是的］。事实证明这些恐怖分子中81%是美国公民 【托尼：嗯】，78%出生在美国【托尼：是的】，11%持有绿卡。只有8%既不是美国公民也不是绿卡持有者【托尼：是的】。并且，后者到达美国之后真正实施恐怖袭击【托尼：犯罪】之前还有一段时间上的空档【托尼：嗯］。所以我很好奇，在对抗意识形态影响的这场战争中，是不是有必要－有一个战略－对抗意识形态，你知道，不简单只是轰炸在美国领土外的恐怖分子，或者是旅行禁令【托尼：是的】。历史上有没有关于这个问题的相关战略呢？
TONY: Yeah, a huge effort has gone into this and I can't say that it's been totally satisfactory, but we've—we work pretty hard both to try to understand better the drivers—what turns someone into a quote-unquote "loser," and at various—what are the different way-stations along the way, and can you interrupt that process at the very start, not when it's already too late. So it's said sometimes there are societal factors, economic factors, political factors, community factors, family factors, you name it. So that's one piece of it, and we try to better understand that and then we'll get the strategy.
Another big piece of it is engagement with the communities—the people who are living in it—because the best way to see something before it becomes a problem, the most likely to have that happen, had a family friend at the community level, not a Washington figurine out in the distance. And that puts a premium on having really good relationships with communities where there are people maybe more at risk of winding up on the wrong side of the line. And having relationships of trust, which is why one of the many reasons why demonizing Muslims or trying to keep people out of the country is not a really smart strategy, because it's the best way to undermine your relationship with the community that you need to be working with, not against.
We look very hard at the impact of the internet, because one of the challenges that emerged is that whereas before the internet, if someone was going to become radicalized, you almost certainly had to have human, face-to-face contact. Now this can happen in the privacy of someone's, you know, bedroom or living room, without actually having direct contact. How do we think about what the proper role is for government and non-governmental groups, making sure that the conversation that's taking place is balanced and not one-sided? In the early days of the Islamic State, when they were very adept at using modern tools of communication, and they were disproportionately present in ways that we weren't. And our first response was, "Oh, we gotta push back, and combat them in whatever way we can, on the internet." And then we came to the realization, through a lot of trial and error, that probably, the U.S. government was not the most credible voice in pushing back. So we looked to spend our resources and focus and energy on identifying credible voices to push back that were not our own. So that's been the evolution there.
And then, of course, you're exactly right—you know, you can't, by definition, you can't bomb this away. So a lot of this is also about creating the right kind of counter-networks of communities, but also police, intelligence, and sharing information in real time in ways that can make you much more effective at identifying people before it's too late and then trying to stop them before it's too late. But the other reality is of course, you know, if you're playing defense, you have to be right 100% of the time. And even if you're right 99% of the time, but that 1% you're not, it can do terrible damage.
Last point is, there is though obviously a role for the big military piece, and in the case of the Islamic State, what's separated them from previous groups is, while the ideology has been to try to form a so-called caliphate, the Islamic State was really the first to, in a very meaningful way, get physical territory and declare the existence of a physical state, not just the idea of one. And that became very powerful, it became very powerful as a practical recruiting tool because it gave foreign fighters an actual place to go to, and that's why we've spent tens of thousands going to Syria, going to Iraq—it was actually there. It was practically powerful as well, because in controlling territory, they also controlled resources to exploit—oil, banks, people. And that actually funded their activities.
But mostly, it was powerful because it was a narrative. And it gave people the impression that they had actually formed a state, that they had realized a physical caliphate. And that became very, very attractive as a story in pulling people in. If you can take that away, if you can destroy the physical caliphate, they declared, then foreign fighters suddenly won't have a place to go. Resources that are being exploited, they don't have. But maybe most important—the narrative is destroyed. And they'll come up with other narratives. But it's still—that had been very powerful. That's why trying to take the fight to the Islamic State, or "Daesh," as we prefer to call it—in Iraq and Syria—in my judgment, at least, was important, because it does take away the physical caliphate.
Now, if you can't replace that with something that brings people along in supporting what comes next, you're gonna wind up right back where you started at some point, and you might have—you might eliminate Daesh now, but if the conditions that led to its emergence are still there, you'll have Daesh 2.0 at some point. So you're only as good as the politics and economics that follow whatever your military does. But I do think that's an important piece too.
当然，如果我们无法在这（摧毁占领地）之后提供当地人们所支持的环境，我们很可能又退回到了最初的起点，我们可能消灭了达伊什， 但是得以让达伊什滋生成长的环境仍然没变，我们就可能会看到达伊什2.0 。所以说，最好的结果只会体现在使用军事力量之后的政治经济战略。不管怎么样，我认为这是一个很重要的组成部分。
It's a long way of saying, there really needs to be a comprehensive approach, and that's what we tried to put in place. But terrorists terror for a reason—it doesn't take much to scare the heck out of people. And because you can't be 100% effective on defense, things are gonna happen. What we're seeing now is, ironically in part because of the success of the effort in Iraq and in Syria to squeeze and limit and ultimately destroy the caliphate, they're trying to push as much as they can in different places around the worlds—either through affiliates or by inspiring people, or just taking credit [YANG: Mhm.] from people who commit acts, who weren't actually instructed by the Islamic State, but then they take advantage of it. And we don't know—at least I don't know enough yet about what happened horrifically yesterday in England, but that seems to be an example of it.
seebadnews YANG: So I see this problem as contention between undemocratic liberalism and democratic illiberalism. [TONY: Mhm.] Citizens have the right to decide the border [TONY: Mhm.]—that's the democratic part—but it can be very illiberal. On the other hand, if we expand the refugee[s], you know, coming into the country, it's undemocratic [TONY: Mhm.], even though it's liberal. So I think the basic thing is how we understand a refugee, how they would affect the economy, how they would affect the community. So I heard lots of other stories on the plus-side of the equation, that the refugee[s], when they come into the country, they've decided to plan long-term [TONY: Mhm.] and they want their children to get a better education and a lot of them are very well-educated. [TONY: Mhm.] So my question is, what are the facts of the refugee[s]? Not necessarily from Syria [TONY: Mhm.], but political refugees and refugees from other countries? [TONY: Mhm.] How can we see the whole picture, not necessarily see the vulnerabilities of the refugees—[that] they are aliens rather than strangers or ethnics, or they are vulnerable to the policy shift. We often depict them as vulnerable people [TONY: Yeah.], so what would be the plus side of the refugees?
看见网·向杨: 我觉得这个问题是非民主自由主义和民主反自由主义之间的抗衡。【托尼：嗯。】公民有权利决定自己国家的边界【托尼：嗯。】——这是民主机制的一部分——当然也可能导致反自由主义出现。另一方面，如果我们（单方面）增加难民进如入这个国家的数量，又是不民主的，即使这（给予更多难民机会进入美国）体现了自由主义精神。所以在我看来，最基本的问题是我们要真正了解不同的难民，了解他们对于经济的影响，以及他们将会如何影响当地社区。我听说很多关于难民带来附加值的说法——当他们进入一个国家，他们一般都有长远的计划，【托尼：嗯】他们希望孩子能够得到更好的教育，他们当中很多人受教育程度非常高 【托尼：嗯】。所以我们的问题是，关于难民情况的真相如何？不一定特指叙利亚难民【托尼：嗯】，也有其他国家来的政治和经济庇护的难民？【托尼：嗯】我们如何有个全局观，不一定是只看到这些难民脆弱的一面——我们看到他们是异乡人，而不是陌生人和不同民族的人，或者认为他们在政策改变时容易处于劣势。我们经常将他们描绘成弱势群体【托尼：是的】， 难民群体的自然优势是什么？
TONY: Well, let me illustrate with a story, for what it's worth. I was in Amman, Jordan for a meeting with a group of Syrian refugees. Not kids, these were teenagers—15, 16, 17 years old, at a center that was basically a community center run by UNICEF, which does remarkable work as well. And we were just sitting around the table, talking, and they had been in Jordan anywhere from a few years to just a few months. And I was just really curious and asking them about how did they think about the future. Did they even think about it, or were they just living in this day-to-day challenge of having been—totally disrupted lives, thrown up in the air. And the first thing that was really interesting was, they all had some vision of what they wanted to do in the future. And I still remember one young woman wanted to be a doctor, another wanted to be in fashion. A couple of the young men wanted, you know, to be in business. One was interested in sports, but they all had some idea. And interestingly, one of the things you see—and this is not at all uniform—but in the case of Syria, often the people who are able to get out tend actually to be middle class. They're the ones who actually have the means and the resources in many cases to actually escape. So when they tend, relatively speaking, to be more educated. So you're dealing with people who, you know, were contributors certainly, to their sides. So that was one thing that was interesting.
托尼：这样吧，我给你说个故事，可能能回答你的问题。我在约旦国首都安曼（AMMAN）的时候见了一些叙利亚难民，不是孩子，都是15，16，17岁的青少年。我们在联合国儿童基金会（The United Nations Children’s Fund）管理的一个社区中心见了面。联合国儿童基金会在那里做了很多很棒的项目。我和那些难民青少年就只是围着桌子坐着聊天，他们有些人在那里几个月，有些人有几年了。我问了他们些问题，很好奇他们对于未来是怎么想的。他们有没有考虑过，或者说他们只是考虑日复一日生活上遇见的挑战——完全被打乱悬在半空中的生活。有意思的是，这些青年人对未来多多少少有些展望。我仍然记得其中一个年轻人想要成为医生，另一个想要在时尚界发展。有好几个年轻人想要从事商业。一个对于体育很感兴趣但他们基本对于未来都有些想法。有意思的是，有一件事——并不是统一的——就叙利亚的情况来说，就是有能力（从战乱国家）逃出来的都是中产阶级。很多情况下，他们中产阶级才有资源和办法真正逃出来。所以这些难民，相对而言，受教育程度更高。（换句话说）我们现在打交道的，你知道，是对社会有贡献的一群难民，这是很有趣的一点。
We're talking and I was wondering the extent to which these kids had access to computers, given the importance of computers in just about everything. So I asked, and the answer I got was also interesting—was that virtually all of them did. Either there was a smart phone in their family—even though they were, you know, left everything—they had money somehow, but one thing that they thought was really important, the families saw as important was to have a smartphone. So they either had that or they had access to computers at the UNICEF community center, so we were talking about that. And then it struck me, and I said, "So, how many of you know what this is?" A couple of them said, "Yeah, that's an iPhone." And I asked them, "Do you know who makes the iPhone?" And a couple of them said, "Oh yeah, Apple." And then I asked, "Do you know who started Apple, who founded the company?" And one of them said, "Oh yeah, Jobs, right, Steve Jobs." And then I said, "Do you know where Steve Jobs' father came from?" There was silence. And of course, he's Syrian. And I say that just to illustrate the point that on one level, arguably, any of those kids, if given the opportunity, could be the next Steve Jobs. Now, not everyone anywhere is gonna be Steve Jobs. But you're dealing with a generation that has just innate talents anywhere. To sacrifice that, to lose that is actually doing a huge disservice, not only to those people, but actually, even potentially to your own country. And again, the United States is kind of in a unique situation because, arguably, we've done better and benefitted more from waves of immigrants than just about any other country on earth, and you can illustrate that in lots of different ways. And you know, you do the thought experiment of thinking of what would the country be like without recent waves of immigrants—well, you know, there goes eBay, there goes Google, there goes Apple. And that's just at the high end—that literally, day in, day out we know in our communities, that people are doing things, for better or worse, that folks who were already here wouldn't choose to do. So, I think there are ways of showing it statistically, there are ways of illustrating it emotionally.
seebadnews·YANG: So one of the arguments against the EU is there's a mismatch between fiscal redistribution and the economy's growth. [TONY: Mhm.] For example, in some Southern European countries, like what they often call "PIIGS," [TONY: Yeah.] they have lots of young people going to France or Germany for job opportunities, [TONY: Yeah.] leaving some older and less enthusiastic, less ambitious people in their own countries. So the economy would take the hit, while the other more like economic engines are unwilling to give the money to them, because it's from their taxpayers. So there's a mismatch of this. [TONY: Yeah.] But in other countries, like the United States, the federal government would redistribute money to some states like Alabama. Also in China [TONY: Yeah.], the central government would redistribute money to the west [TONY: Yeah.] to Tibet. So will this be the headache in the future and will there be a pathway forward?
向杨: 关于欧盟的争论有一点涉及到财政支付转移和经济增长的不匹配 【TONY: 嗯】。 比如说，在南欧一些国家，人们通常称为“欧猪五国”（注：即“PIIGS”，系国际债券分析家、学者和国际经济界对欧洲五个主权债券信用评级较低的经济体的贬称。分别是葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊、西班牙的首字母。）的那些国家【TONY:嗯】，这些国家的许多年轻人回去法国或者德国寻找工作机会【TONY:嗯】，留下了年纪大和那些热情不高，野心不大的人留在了自己国家，所以这些国家的经济会受到打击，然而另外一些被称作欧洲经济引擎的国家（如德国、法国）并不情愿给前者提供经济上的帮助，因为这些经济补助是从他们自己国家的纳税人手里出的。所以我们就看到了这种财政和经济的不匹配【TONY:嗯】。在另外一些国家，如美国，联邦政府会给像是阿拉巴马这样的州在财政上拨款。在中国也是【TONY：是的】，中央政府会给西部地区，如西藏地区拨款。所以您认为在未来，这将会成为欧元区令人头痛的问题，还是未来会有继续前进的解决方案？
TONY: Yeah, I think you also identify one of the other truly central problems and one that we've seen play out in the Eurozone crisis. You have—I'm going back, you know, seven, eight years, the economic crisis that even well before Brexit, well before Le Pen, well before Wilders—those kind of political challenges was a dagger pointed at the heart of the youth. And it's had a hugely tough time grappling with that, and it still hasn't figured it out. And it's been a division between leading countries that think that the recipe for these questions is heightened and developed prosperity, that's the German approach. And those who think that to the contrary, you need to—particularly a country like Greece, or Italy before that, Spain, Portugal—actually show some largess and spend money to bolster people, and you have this divide.
托尼：是的， 我认为你指出了欧洲众多问提中一个真正的核心，一个在欧洲金融危机中我们看到的问题。让我从7年，8年前的金融危机说起，从英国脱欧之前，从Le Pen 和Wilders出现之前（注：Marine Le Pan: 法国极右翼政党“国民阵线”前主席，2017法国总统竞选候选人，败于马克龙；Geert Wilders是荷兰自由党领导人，以批评伊斯兰教在国内外知名。）——这些政治危机是插在年轻人心中的一把匕首。这些欧洲国家经历了一个很痛苦的过程解读这个问题和找到解决方案。这个问题在特别发达的国家和剩下的一些国家中导致了分歧，主导经济发展的国家认为解决方案就是经济更高速的发展，这是德国的一套。另一些国家正相反，他们需要——特别是像希腊或者意大利，在这之前是西班牙和葡萄牙——引擎国家（指德法两国）真正体现出慷慨（指财政补助），在这些弱国的老百姓身上花钱来激励他们。于是我们就看到了欧洲不同国家政策的分歧。
In Europe, at the same time, exactly as you pointed out, the very freedom of movement has been at the heart of the European project, has also created these big imbalances. Arguably, overall, it's clearly been beneficial, and it's arguably been overall more efficient in directing people to where jobs might be. And so—and without regulations. You know, you can be a Romanian airline pilot flying for Air France and you don't have to get re-licensed across the border. But, in good times, that's terrific. The pie gets bigger, there's plenty to go around, and everyone benefits. But when you're going through tough times, then some of this stuff really creates a problem, and all of a sudden, the famous Polish plumber is putting French plumbers out of a job, or Romanian construction worker is doing the same thing. And that's when people start to become protectionist. But they can't, because of the EU are such that there can't really be significant national protections, and that's when you get this big pushback.
So part of it is, how do you—how does the Union allocate resources and particularly, what does it do when countries get into trouble? And part of it is, how does it mitigate the downsides of all of this freedom of movement, and not just take advantage of the upsides? How does it figure out a way forward? And there are real ideological differences among the leading countries about how to do that. What's interesting now is, the question is whether the French or Germans come a little bit closer together. And the Germans have of course benefitted hugely, because they've been able to have an export-driven economy by supporting to all the other countries in the Union and they want to preserve that. It's going to be interesting to see what Macron does as he is trying to reform the French economy, what is it the Germans like. But at the same time, wants to see the Germans, in effect, invest more in the rest of Europe. That's the other question.